

# *Prevent* – a strategic framework for police authorities

Association of Police Authorities



# Contents

<b>0 Overview</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2 Background</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>3 HM Government's <i>Prevent</i> Strategy</b>	<b>7</b>
<i>Prevent</i> Strategy objectives	7
<b>4 Police authority context</b>	<b>8</b>
Strategic role of police authorities	8
Impact on communities	8
Proportionate response	9
'Business as usual'	9
Police authority statutory responsibilities	10
Police authority national and regional oversight	10
Local governance and oversight	11
Security clearance and vetting	11
Summary of police authority guidance and advisory points	12
<b>5 <i>Prevent</i> strategic framework for police authorities</b>	<b>14</b>
Priority and non-priority areas	14
Relationship to national <i>Prevent</i> strategy	14
<i>Prevent</i> strategic priorities	15
Leadership and governance	15
Consultation and engagement	16
Strategic partnerships	17
Ensuring outcomes	18
Using the strategic framework priorities and actions	19
<b>Appendix 1</b> National, regional, and local <i>Prevent</i> partners	<b>20</b>
<b>Appendix 2</b> <i>Prevent</i> performance management	<b>29</b>
<b>Appendix 3</b> HMIC <i>Prevent</i> summary	<b>31</b>
<b>Appendix 4</b> Glossary	<b>32</b>
<b>Appendix 5</b> References and further information	<b>38</b>

# 0 Overview

**0.1** This APA *Prevent* strategy document is designed to provide a broad strategic framework in which individual police authorities can develop their own proportionate response to *Prevent*. It sets out the national strategic context of *Prevent* from government, and describes the governance and management structures of *Prevent* delivery at a national government level and particularly in relation to policing. In short, it describes the 'why' and the 'what' police authorities should do in relation to *Prevent*. Detailed implementation guidance providing further details on the 'how' will be produced by the APA in December 2009.

**0.2** Clearly police authorities will be primarily concerned specifically with policing in relation to *Prevent*, but this can not be considered in isolation of the broader partnership context of *Prevent* work. An outline of the key national, regional, and local partnership governance structures for *Prevent* are included here.

**0.3** It is intended to be used to inform police authorities of both the national, regional and local context and expectations in relation to *Prevent* delivery in order that they can decide how best to establish and situate the role of the authority. A proportionate response to *Prevent* will differ from one police authority to the next, and should be predicated upon the level of identified risk within the force area.

**0.4** The key function in terms of *Prevent*, as with all other areas of policing, is for the police authority to discharge its statutory responsibility to ensure an effective and efficient service.

**0.5** However, in addition the police authority is in a unique position to also contribute strategically to the development of force work on *Prevent*, primarily through its direct strategic partnership and consultation and engagement functions. A number of police authorities have adopted this role enthusiastically, while others are concentrating on their governance and oversight function. This may often be a consequence of available resources, but also reflects a difference in approach to *Prevent*

responsibilities, although ultimately should be based upon the level of identified risk within the force area.

**0.6** The document is structured in three main parts. The first three sections provide an overview of, and introduction to, *Prevent*. Section four seeks to place the role of police authorities in context, and provides a range of advisory and guidance points which are summarised at the end of the section. This summary table also links the main guidance points to the identified priority actions within the framework tables in section five, suggesting how the main advisory and guidance points are achieved through delivering a range of actions. Section five offers what is termed a strategic framework recommending police authority action under four strategic priority headings. It is conceived as a framework with the intention that police authorities can use elements of the actions to 'build' and develop their own local proportionate response and planning in relation to *Prevent* dependent upon identified risk and local circumstances.

The detailed contextual information, including the roles of national, regional and local *Prevent* partners, information on performance management, and a glossary and references for further information are provided in the appendices.

# 1 Introduction

## Preventing violent extremism (*Prevent*)

**1.1** Dealing with violent extremism is not a new challenge. Throughout history there have been groups prepared to use violence to achieve their aims. There are many forms of extremism and prejudice trying to sow division in this country, for example, the hateful views and actions of extreme right-wing groups. Currently the security and intelligence services threat assessment is that the most acute terrorist threat comes from Al-Qaida and associated networks, and those who share Al-Qaida's ideology but do not have direct contact with them.<sup>1</sup>

**1.2** This often manifests itself in individuals and groups who distort Islam to attempt to justify the use of extreme violence. Such activity, unless addressed, can be a catalyst for alienation and disaffection and potentially lead to violence. The national *Prevent* strategy sets out how government will address this threat to reduce the risk to all of our communities and assist in the long term security and cohesion of the UK.

**1.3** Following the development of the Government's *Prevent* Strategy<sup>2</sup> and the Association of Chief Police Officers' (ACPO) *Prevent* Strategy and Delivery Plan,<sup>3</sup> this document sets out a strategic framework for the role of police authorities in contributing to the *Prevent* agenda.

**1.4** Police authorities have a number of existing key statutory responsibilities that support the objectives of *Prevent*, but *Prevent* also provides new challenges, and this strategy sets out some of the areas of work where police authorities might consider additional approaches to meet these challenges.

**1.5** The Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Learning and Development Exercise report produced by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission in October 2008<sup>4</sup> highlights that police authority members demonstrated a high level of involvement in *Prevent*, and this was particularly apparent in areas hosting Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs) and

Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) where members have been engaged in the development of the national counter terrorism (CT) network since its inception in 2006/07.

**1.6** All police authorities have a key role in contributing to the counter-terrorism agenda, including *Prevent*. Whilst some areas are identified, from a number of factors, of being of higher priority, the counter-terrorism agenda is relevant to all police force and authority areas. Forces and authorities must therefore consider their potential contributions.

**1.7** Some police authorities have expressed concern that *Prevent* poses a potential conflict of agendas and roles between resourcing and supporting the delivery of *Prevent* policing locally but at the same time ensuring that a range of authority equalities, human rights, and public reassurance duties are not compromised. In short there are concerns that *Prevent* could be counter-productive and have adverse impacts upon trust and confidence in policing and community cohesion. This is a significant challenge for police authorities but can be addressed by ensuring an effective understanding of intelligence assessments of levels of risk, informed scrutiny of force responses to the policing of this risk, and effective monitoring of impact, and engagement with, affected communities. Also important is the management of risk to *Prevent* relationships and activity intrinsic in Pursue operations.

**1.8** The background information below provides the context to counter-terrorism, the *Prevent* agenda, and provides an outline of the key aspects of the *Prevent* strategy where the police authority can most effectively contribute.

**1** [www.mi5.gov.uk/output/international-terrorism-and-the-uk.html](http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/international-terrorism-and-the-uk.html)  
See also HM Government, *CONTEST Strategy – The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*, March 2009, p30-33 for information on the current threat to the UK.  
[http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO\\_Contest\\_strategy.pdf](http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf)

**2** HM Government *Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England*, June 2008. <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/Prevent-strategy/>

**3** *Prevent: The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism – Strategy and Delivery Plan*, ACPO, April 2008.

**4** HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Audit Commission, *Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise*, November 2008.  
<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspection/thematic/Prevent-vio-ext-learning-dev/>

## 2 Background

**2.1** The Government has had a counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) since 2003. Following the London bombings in July 2005, CONTEST was refreshed in 2006, making available significant additional funding to grow police counter-terrorism capability. The aim of the strategy is **‘to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence’**.

**2.2** More recently CONTEST has been updated (known as CONTEST 2, published in March 2009)<sup>5</sup> to take account of lessons learned in delivery, the evolution of the threat and the greater resources which have been made available by the Government to address it.

**2.3** The delivery of CONTEST is organised around four workstreams:

- **Pursue** – stop terrorist attacks;
- **Prepare** – where we cannot stop an attack, mitigate its impact;
- **Protect** – strengthen our overall protection against terrorists attacks; and

- **Prevent** – stop people becoming terrorists and supporting violent extremism.

**2.4** Responsibility for the overall strategy and the *Prevent* strand falls with a number of government departments, and relies on collaborative and coordinated local delivery. There are clear linkages across the four strands and while the purpose of this strategy is to provide a framework for police authorities on *Prevent*, it is important that this is not viewed in isolation of the other strands. The geographical area may include high profile or critical infrastructure potential targets which need to be taken into account in considering the level of risk. There are particularly clear links between *Prevent* and Pursue and work is developing nationally looking at the *Prevent/Pursue* overlap.

**2.5** In addition *Prevent* is delivered locally by a range of partners, and it is important to consider the contribution of the police authority as part of a wider local strategy.

<sup>5</sup> HM Government, CONTEST Strategy – *The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*, March 2009. [http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO\\_Contest\\_strategy.pdf](http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf)

# 3 HM Government's Prevent Strategy

**3.1** A cross-departmental *Prevent* Strategy was introduced in 2008, but prior to this the development of *Prevent* work had been underway since 2006 when The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) launched The Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund<sup>6</sup> to support priority local authorities in developing programmes of activity to tackle violent extremism at a local level.

**3.2** This fund made £6m available to 70 priority local authorities to build on their existing work to engage with communities, forge partnerships with police, community and faith groups and work with mosques and education institutions. The CLG Preventing Violent Extremism programme continues to form a key part of the Government's *Prevent* Strategy with the provision of a further £45m to local authorities between 2008 and 2011 to continue developing work.<sup>7</sup>

**3.3** The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)<sup>8</sup> was formed within the Home Office in 2007 with an early priority to assess *Prevent*, culminating in the publication of the *Prevent* Strategy and delivery plan in June 2008.

**3.4** The strategy was put together by OSCT but captured the contributions of a broad range of governmental departments and agencies to *Prevent*. This is reflected in the range of government departments and agencies that have developed *Prevent* products and activity. This has included:

- **Youth Justice Board (YJB) PVE funding for Youth Offending Teams;**
- **Department for Children, Families and Schools toolkit on extremism, 'Learning Together to be Safe';**
- **Department for Business, Innovation and Skills guidance on extremism, within further and higher education institutions;**
- **continuing CLG work, including the Community Leadership Fund and the Challenge and Innovation Fund;** and
- **in addition *Prevent* teams or posts have been established in almost all government**

**departments and with other agencies such as the National Offender Management Service and the UK Border Agency.**

## **Prevent Strategy objectives**

**3.5** The Government's *Prevent* Strategy identifies the following five objectives:

- **to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices;**
- **disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate;**
- **support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists;**
- **increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism;** and
- **address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting.**

And two supporting objectives:

- **to develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information;** and
- **to improve our strategic communications.**

**3.6** Following the publication of the *Prevent* Strategy, the Home Office wrote to all local authority chief executives and police Basic Command Unit (BCU) Commanders requesting that a local *Prevent* partnership be developed and an enhanced action plan produced by the end of January 2009, for the financial year 2009/10. These action plans are currently being refreshed in light of further learning and counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs).<sup>9</sup> (Action plans were due to be completed in Wales by September 2009.)

**3.7** For some areas other than those specifically funded by CLG Pathfinder funding this will have been the first instance of being required to develop *Prevent* activity, and to some extent explains the unequal development of *Prevent* activity in local areas that police authorities will encounter in their force area.

**6** DCLG, *Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Guidance Note*, February 2007  
[www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/Preventingviolentpathfinderfund](http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/Preventingviolentpathfinderfund)

**7** For further details and a list of local authorities receiving funding see [www.communities.gov.uk/communities/Preventingextremism/lafunding/](http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/Preventingextremism/lafunding/)

**8** <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

**9** HM Government, *Delivering the Prevent Strategy: Practical Steps for Local Partners*, September 2008, updated June 2009. <http://Prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/assets/pdf/Delivering%20the%20Prevent%20Strategy%2011092008.pdf>

# 4 Police authority context

## Strategic role of police authorities

**'The police authority therefore has a role in ensuring that the force's approach to Preventing violent extremism is appropriate, is effective and makes good use of resources and partnership arrangements.'**<sup>10</sup>

**4.1** The core function for all police authorities in relation to *Prevent* is to provide leadership and governance to the force, and to hold the chief constable to account through effective oversight and scrutiny.

**4.2** This applies to all police authorities regardless of the levels of risk of violent extremism within the force area. The nature and scope of the governance and scrutiny arrangements may differ depending on the level of risk, but there are fundamental actions that the authority needs to satisfy itself that the force has undertaken.

**4.3** Ensuring that its force is providing an efficient and effective service in relation to *Prevent* is a basic requirement, and one of the drivers of additional police authority activity should be based upon its assessment of the force delivery and where it believes it can bring added value in relation to *Prevent*.

**4.4** In this respect ensuring that governance and oversight structures and processes for scrutiny of *Prevent* delivery by the force are fit for purpose is a prerequisite for delivering additional police authority activity on *Prevent* with confidence. It provides the evidence base and rationale for that additional activity.

**4.5** Fundamentally the governance and oversight framework for *Prevent* policing will contain generic elements applicable across all police authorities,<sup>11</sup> for example:

- **identifying the level of risk;**
- **providing strategic leadership;**
- **ensuring *Prevent* strategy and implementation plans are in place;**

- **ensuring staff levels and deployment levels are appropriate;**
- **scrutinising resourcing and funding arrangements;**
- **supporting and enabling local *Prevent* partnership development;**
- **ensuring information sharing processes are in place;**
- **ensuring *Prevent* delivery processes are in place at BCU level;**
- **embedding of *Prevent* in neighbourhood policing;**
- **ensuring consultation and engagement with communities;**
- **monitoring outcomes and impact;** and
- **ensuring performance management processes are in place.**

**4.6** However, clearly, different forces will experience different levels and types of risk and police authorities covering high priority areas will require additional reassurance from the force in relation to the level of *Prevent* activity. In some areas this will include oversight of CTU/CTIU activity.

## Impact on communities

**4.7** The *Prevent* agenda is both a contentious and rapidly developing one, with some police authorities taking the view that activity to address *Prevent* issues is best located within enhanced community cohesion work. There are real concerns in some police authorities about the adverse impacts of *Prevent* policing on large communities within their areas.

**4.8** For large sections of local communities it is an agenda that raises significant issues of trust and relationships (particularly with the police), and this is often exacerbated by media reporting on *Prevent*. Effective *Prevent* policing should bring about an increase in community trust and confidence. Key to this is working in partnership and where

**10** HM Government, *Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England*, June 2008, p48

**11** Further guidance on governance and oversight is available in the *APA Guidance for Police Authorities on the Performance Monitoring and Scrutiny of Protective Services*, in particular chapter seven covering counter-terrorism and the *Prevent* strand. It is available through the member's area of the APA website <http://www.apa.police.uk/NR/rdonlyres/ED7F6C9A-73B4-4338-A64F-FD28D4E32E89/0/ProtectiveServicesGuidanceNov08.pdf> More detailed guidance and *Prevent* scrutiny frameworks will be developed by the APA through *Prevent* implementation guidance to be produced December 2009.

appropriate supporting other partners in being the 'public face' of *Prevent*

**4.9** High priority areas in relation to *Prevent* will experience significant levels of *Prevent* work, not just in purely policing terms but also from wider partnership activity funded through, for example, the CLG PVE fund and YJB PVE fund. Public awareness of, and therefore reaction to, will be heightened within those areas.

**4.10** Adverse impacts in relation to counter-terrorism and *Prevent* can have significant impacts on levels of satisfaction and confidence amongst communities and police authorities will wish to consider the potential impacts on perceptions of policing and possibly address these through communications and engagement strategies. In those areas of higher *Prevent* activity police authorities may also wish to engage more pro-actively with local *Prevent* partnerships.

**4.11** Tension monitoring is one of the ways in which forces and authorities can assess the impact of *Prevent* on communities, but also serves to identify a range of extremisms, other than an Al-Qaida ideologically driven threat, within local areas, that might necessitate *Prevent* activity. Police authorities will want to satisfy themselves that their force is utilising support from the National Community Tension Team<sup>12</sup> within the ACPO National *Prevent* Delivery Unit and contributing to and receiving Operation Element.

### Proportionate response

**4.12** One of the key underlying principles for police authorities response to *Prevent* is that it should be 'proportionate and appropriate', and this will be dependent upon the confluence of vulnerability and threat and the subsequent level of risk. One size does not fit all for *Prevent*.

**4.13** Additional activity over and above the core function of governance and scrutiny should be led by the specific levels of risk of violent extremism or threat of terrorism within an area.

**4.14** Most police authorities will initiate additional *Prevent*-related activity through, for example, consultation and engagement and strategic partnership work but the level of this will need to be guided by the specific situation within the force area.

**4.15** In addition, another consideration is that police authorities hold different perceptions on, and adopt different approaches to, their role in *Prevent*.

**4.16** One common view is that fundamentally the role of the police authority is to ensure that *Prevent* work is happening, and, depending on a number of factors, different authorities will have different ways of doing this. For example, well resourced police authorities may have direct community engagement functions, while others may prefer to ensure engagement happens on *Prevent* through the local authority or the CDRP.

### 'Business as usual'

**4.17** One of the key objectives within the ACPO *Prevent* Implementation plan is to ensure that *Prevent* becomes part of regular business by assimilating it into neighbourhood policing. While there will always remain a requirement for specialist counter-terrorism and *Prevent* functions, police authorities should satisfy themselves that *Prevent* is understood and implemented by neighbourhood policing teams and other police departments.

**4.18** It will be important that a mainstreamed approach is taken across frontline services, supported by appropriate training, resources and leadership. This is what HMIC refer to as 'integrating *Prevent* within daily business' in the recent inspection report.<sup>13</sup> What this entails in reality for police authorities is scrutiny not just of a specific counter-terrorism function but all aspects of policing from a *Prevent* perspective.

**4.19** In the same way, police authorities should consider their approach to *Prevent* as part of a wider range of other responsibilities, such as community engagement, providing information to the public, promoting safety and public protection,

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.acpo.police.uk/NCTT/aboutnctt.asp>

<sup>13</sup> HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, *Prevent – Progress and Prospects*, July 2009, p6  
<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections/thematic/Prevent-report/Prevent-report?view=Binary>

promoting diversity, fairness and equality, performance management, partnership working and human resources, and not just as a distinct and separate issue.

**4.20** Although *Prevent* will offer new challenges to police authorities, when considering their response and contribution to preventing terrorism, police authorities are encouraged to embed the objectives of *Prevent* within their existing structures and processes in a way that most appropriately reflects their local circumstances and specific risks.

**4.21** *Prevent* considerations can be assimilated into existing police authority work in a number of ways through, for example, overt consideration of *Prevent* impacts in the exercising of a range of existing duties relevant to *Prevent*.

#### **Police authority statutory responsibilities**

**4.22** Although there are no additional statutory responsibilities for police authorities directly relevant to *Prevent*, there is a significant relationship to existing duties. A summary of key relevant statutory responsibilities related to *Prevent* objectives is provided below:

- **Police Act 1996 Section 3 – General Functions: ‘every police authority shall secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force for its area’;**
- **Police Act 1996 Section 96 – secure arrangements for obtaining the views of communities, and for securing their cooperation;**
- **Police Act 1996 Section 7 – every police authority shall, before the beginning of each financial year, determine objectives for the policing of the authority’s area during that year;**
- **Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 – providing information to communities through the publication and distribution of Local Policing Summaries;**

- **Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 – have due regard to the need: to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination; and to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups;**
- **Children Act 2004 Section 10 and 11 – make arrangements to co-operate with local authorities to improve the well being of children and young people; have regard to the need to safeguard and promote welfare of children and young people; and**
- **Police and Justice Act 2006 (and subsequent statutory instrument 2008 No. 82) – ‘police authorities shall monitor the performance of the police force maintained for its area in complying with the duties imposed on that force by the Human Rights Act 1998’.**

#### **Police authority national and regional oversight**

**4.23** The Counter-Terrorism Oversight Group was formed in April 2007 to establish co-ordinated scrutiny of the Counter Terrorist Units (CTUs) and national protocols for dual accountability during large-scale national counter terrorist operations between all police authorities and the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA). The group originally consisted of police authority representatives from the five CTUs (including the Metropolitan Police Service [MPS] Counter Terrorism Command [CTC]). In November 2008 police authority representatives from the four CTIU authorities joined the group following the expansion of the national CT network.

**4.24** The remit of the group is to ‘establish co-ordinated oversight of the five CTUs (and the four CTIUs) for England and Wales, working to secure effective and efficient policing in authority areas and for the national counter terrorism build by supporting the Police Counter Terrorism Board in its strategic governance role.’ The group does not have executive powers and host forces for CTUs and CTIUs should continue to provide effective oversight of regional delivery.

## Local governance and oversight

**4.25** Most police authorities have begun the process of establishing governance and oversight structures for *Prevent* and CT more generally. Most have nominated lead members and officers for *Prevent* and have membership of the Force *Prevent* Board.

**4.26** Authorities are also locating *Prevent* within their committee business processes, some in CT/Protective Services Committees, while others locate *Prevent* in committees concerned primarily with partnership and engagement. This may reflect a slight difference in emphasis, but whichever governance structure is used, authorities need to satisfy themselves that the force is delivering effectively and efficiently on *Prevent*.

**4.27** *Prevent* cross-cuts many aspects of police authority business and to assist in ensuring that *Prevent* becomes part of daily business and is considered from all relevant perspectives, including equalities, finance, young people and training to mention but a few, one approach would be to have a *Prevent* agenda item on all police authority committees.

**4.28** The police authority will need to be briefed on the level of risk within its force area in order to be able to make a judgement about its forces level of response and activity, and any additional work that it might undertake on *Prevent* over and above governance and scrutiny of force activity and performance.

## Security clearance and vetting

**4.29** A number of authorities have expressed concern and confusion over the requirements in relation to vetting and security clearance in order for them to be able to effectively discharge their oversight and scrutiny function in relation to counter-terrorism and *Prevent*. Many others report no difficulties in relation to receiving necessary information from force. Clearly forces have different perspectives and interpretations of the levels of security clearance required by police authority members involved in *Prevent* oversight work. The

APA vetting survey of authorities also revealed a wide disparity in the policy and practice in relation to security clearance of members and officers.

**4.30** Many *Prevent* products from the Security Service or the CT Network are increasingly published under the Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS) at RESTRICTED level which requires no specific security clearance, and is distributed on a 'need to know' basis. The HMIC Inspection Report on *Prevent* notes that 'vetting is an unnecessary distraction in taking forward information sharing – a 'red herring'.<sup>14</sup>

**4.31** Counter Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLP), for example, are marked as RESTRICTED and SECRET under the GPMS, with processes to ensure that those who need to see it to facilitate *Prevent* delivery will have access. The report goes on to say that 'in only a few cases will there be a need for access to more sensitive information for which vetting may be required'.<sup>15</sup>

**4.32** The HMIC report also notes that 'there needs to be greater clarity around what vetting levels, if any, are required and by whom. Explicit agreed guidance around vetting levels would provide the necessary clarity for all local partners'.<sup>16</sup>

**4.33** The report formally recommends that

**ACPO, Home Office, Security Service, LGA and WAG should agree simple but explicit guidance for forces and local partners to improve understanding about:**

- **restrictions and permissions provided by different levels of vetting for those engaged in *Prevent*; and**
- **permitted access to different levels of GPMS information.**<sup>17</sup>

**4.34** As an interim position ahead of formally agreed guidance on security clearance, the current APA view is that in broad *Prevent* policy terms there is no requirement for specific clearance. Vetting should not be a barrier to sharing counter terrorism related material above RESTRICTED level.

**14** Ibid. p25

**15** Ibid. p25

**16** Ibid. p25

**17** Ibid. p25

Consideration about whether it is appropriate for an individual to be vetted should take place at a local level and on a case by case basis.<sup>18</sup> APA advice is therefore that in broad *Prevent* policy terms there is no requirement for specific clearance.

**4.35** For police authority members and officers involved in detailed *Prevent* management and scrutiny work which requires access to sensitive material, APA would recommend following Security Service and Cabinet Office guidelines and have officers and members cleared to CTC (Counter-Terrorism Check) level.

**4.36** CTC vetting has been considered as sufficient for members of the Counter-Terrorism Oversight Group, and in light of this the APA Strategic Policing Policy Network are recommending the CTC standard of vetting as the minimum standard for members and staff who require vetting to deal with CT matters across all police authorities.

**4.37** It may be necessary in relation to specific operational information for higher levels of clearance, including Security Clearance or Develop Vetting.

#### 4.38 Summary of police authority guidance and advisory points

Paragraph	Guidance/ advisory point	Link to strategic framework priority actions
0.2	The primary concern of police authorities in relation to <i>Prevent</i> is from a policing perspective, but consideration needs to be given to where the police authority can add value in a partnership context	Leadership & Governance <b>PA3</b> Consultation & Engagement <b>PA6,7</b>
0.3 4.2 4.5	All police authorities have a role in contributing to the CT agenda, and should develop a proportionate response to <i>Prevent</i> based primarily upon the levels of identified risk to violent extremism within the force area	Leadership & Governance <b>PA8,9</b>
0.4 4.1	The key function of police authorities on <i>Prevent</i> is governance and scrutiny through discharging their statutory responsibility to ensure an effective and efficient service	Leadership & Governance <b>PA1,4,5,6</b>
4.6	High priority area police authorities will require increased reassurance from the force in relation to the level of <i>Prevent</i> activity. In some areas this will include oversight of CTU/CTIU activity	Leadership & Governance <b>PA10</b>
4.27	To ensure effective integration of <i>Prevent</i> within neighbourhood policing, authorities should scrutinise not just the specific counter-terrorism function but all aspects of policing from a <i>Prevent</i> perspective	Leadership & Governance <b>PA2,7,12</b> Consultation & Engagement <b>PA4,10</b>

**18** *Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An updated Guide for Local Partners*, August 2009, Vetting and Security classification. Further advice, including the possibility of funding for vetting, is available from OSCT by emailing Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

Paragraph	Guidance/ advisory point	Link to strategic framework priority actions
0.5	Where appropriate police authorities can also add value through their strategic role in regional and local partnerships and in community consultation and engagement	Strategic Partnerships <b>PA1,2,5,9</b>
1.7	Adverse impacts on local communities can be monitored and managed by an effective understanding of intelligence assessments of levels of risk, informed scrutiny of the force response, and developed consultation and engagement with affected communities	Leadership and Governance <b>PA 11</b> Consultation & Engagement <b>PA1,2,3,5,7</b>
1.j	Government Offices (GOs) play a pivotal role regionally as an interface between <i>Prevent</i> partners. Police authorities should as a minimum consider the development of relationships with the Regional <i>Prevent</i> Manager based in the GOs	Strategic Partnerships <b>PA3,4,6,7,10</b>
1.o	Police authorities should be members of local <i>Prevent</i> partnership governance structures, with an emphasis on high priority BCU areas	Strategic Partnerships <b>PA8</b>
4.22	There are a range of existing key statutory responsibilities for police authorities relevant to <i>Prevent</i>	Consultation & Engagement <b>PA6,8,9</b>
1.a/1.l	Police authorities should be engaged, consulted or sighted on force, BCU and partnership <i>Prevent</i> action plans	Ensuring Outcomes <b>PA2,3,5</b>
Appendix 2/ 4.5	Police authorities need to satisfy themselves that <i>Prevent</i> interventions are monitored and outcomes measured effectively	Ensuring Outcomes <b>PA1,4,6,7</b>

# 5 Prevent strategic framework for police authorities

**5.1** This section offers a strategic framework within which individual police authorities can locate their own *Prevent* strategy and begin to develop action plans. It is not intended to be a prescriptive model but reflects a range of key functions which consultation with police authorities on has revealed a general consensus. The model also reflects a developing view on the role of police authorities within *Prevent* from a broad range of national partners, including ACPO, HMIC, and the Home Office.

**5.2** The framework offers four key strategic priority headings and a number of suggested objectives under each priority. This is not an exhaustive list but seeks to capture the generic *Prevent* roles and responsibilities of all police authorities. Different authorities will initiate actions within these priorities to a greater or lesser degree, depending on their specific situation in relation to risk. A proportionate response will need to be determined locally.

**5.3** Both ACPO and HMIC increasingly place an emphasis on the importance of prioritising areas of highest risk, and therefore developing a proportionate response on *Prevent*.

**5.4** 'Heat-maps' were produced in 2007 on the basis of the best possible indicators of risk, including priority extremist targets, reports of extremist activity, and 2001 census data on the Muslim population for context. Updated heat-maps were issued in April 2009, and there are now clearly identified high risk areas both by police force and local authority area. Police authorities should ensure that they are aware of the relative position of their force area and local authorities within it as a starting point to determining their force and local authority areas risk and priority status.

## **Prevent minimum capabilities**

**5.5** The priority headings within the strategic framework align closely with the development of minimum levels of local, force and regional capability for *Prevent* by ACPO which take forward Recommendations 2 and 3 of the HMIC report on *Prevent*. Minimum capabilities are set out under the headings of 'leadership, governance, and structures', 'understanding vulnerability', 'community partnerships and interventions' and 'assessing progress'. These capabilities will inform the next revision of the ACPO Protective Services Minimum Standards, and will provide a basis for police authority oversight of local, force, and regional delivery of *Prevent*.

**5.6** The development of additional capability on *Prevent* by forces will be required in those areas where the level of risk is higher, and the extent to which the objectives and priorities outlined below should be adopted by police authorities will differ depending on the level of risk within their area.

## **Relationship to national Prevent Strategy**

**5.7** While the strategic objectives outlined below relate to, and will contribute to, national *Prevent* Strategy objectives, the priority actions are not framed specifically within the five primary and two supporting objectives of that strategy.

**5.8** This better reflects the strategic role of police authorities in facilitating and overseeing *Prevent* delivery. The broad strategic objectives and indicators also reflect the fact that police authorities differ in approach, perspective, size, and priority status, in relation to *Prevent*.

## **5.9 The four key strategic priority headings are:**

- leadership and governance;
- consultation and engagement;
- strategic partnerships; and
- ensuring outcomes.

<b>Strategic priority</b>	<b>Leadership and governance</b>
<b>Objective</b>	To provide leadership and support to, and governance and oversight of, force delivery on <i>Prevent</i>
<b>Priority actions (PA)</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Establish a <i>Prevent</i> lead member/committee/officer</li> <li>2 Police authority members and officers receive <i>Prevent</i> briefing/training</li> <li>3 Ensure force has ACPO rank <i>Prevent</i> Strategic Lead</li> <li>4 Ensure there is an oversight framework for force delivery on <i>Prevent</i></li> <li>5 Representation on the Force <i>Prevent</i> Board or equivalent governance structure</li> <li>6 Provide an effective challenge to the force on <i>Prevent</i> delivery</li> <li>7 Consider <i>Prevent</i> from a cross-cutting perspective by integrating into all business areas of the authority</li> <li>8 Ensure that the force has a detailed understanding of risk levels of violent extremism</li> <li>9 Police authority should satisfy itself that the information and intelligence available on risk is rigorous and sufficient to direct force resources and activity</li> <li>10 Ensure force has the necessary resources commensurate to risk to deliver a proportionate response to <i>Prevent</i></li> <li>11 Ensure the force has appropriate and up to date community mapping and neighbourhood profiling</li> <li>12 Ensure the force is seeking to assimilate <i>Prevent</i> into operational policing through appropriate communication and staff training</li> <li>13 Where appropriate ensure effective scrutiny of CTUs/CTIUs, including staffing levels</li> </ol>

<b>Strategic priority</b>	<b>Consultation and engagement</b>
<b>Objective</b>	To ensure that <i>Prevent</i> is taken into consideration in the authority consultation, engagement and communication strategies and to develop specific engagement activity with affected communities if necessary
<b>Priority actions (PA)</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Ensure methods for engaging with hard to hear communities, including faith groups, women and young people</li> <li>2 Monitor the impact of <i>Prevent</i> policing on communities and develop engagement activity to mitigate adverse impacts and develop learning points for the force where appropriate</li> <li>3 Police authority engagement is informed by community tensions monitoring</li> <li>4 Police authority should satisfy itself that effective community engagement informs <i>Prevent</i> policing where appropriate</li> <li>5 In priority areas pro-actively engage with local communities on <i>Prevent</i> policing</li> <li>6 Ensure effective communication on <i>Prevent</i> with local partners and communities</li> <li>7 Awareness-raising exercises, including Act Now and Operation Nicole, are utilised with local partners and communities</li> <li>8 Ensure police authority and force have developed incident contingency plans and process</li> <li>9 Ensure <i>Prevent</i> equalities impact assessments are conducted</li> <li>10 Ensure force implements Intelligence and Community Engagement (ICE) Training for its neighbourhood policing teams</li> </ol>

<b>Strategic priority</b>	<b>Strategic partnerships</b>
<b>Objective</b>	The authority should satisfy itself that effective local <i>Prevent</i> partnerships are established, that local <i>Prevent</i> action plans are developed and delivered, and that the force is a significant partner in this process
<b>Priority actions (PA)</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Where appropriate the authority should be represented on the local <i>Prevent</i> partnership</li> <li>2 Police authority members utilise their position to enhance local <i>Prevent</i> partnership development where appropriate</li> <li>3 Ensure <i>Prevent</i> partnerships have a clearly defined governance and management structure</li> <li>4 Ensure information and intelligence sharing agreements are developed</li> <li>5 <i>Prevent</i> is integrated within local partnership structures, including joint assessments of risk, and development, delivery, and assessment of interventions</li> <li>6 Authorities should ensure that partnerships are functioning effectively with the engagement of relevant partners</li> <li>7 Authorities should seek representation on <i>Prevent</i> regional meetings through GO</li> <li>8 Ensure that local <i>Prevent</i> partnerships understand the policing relationship to Pursue</li> <li>9 Ensure specific strategic relationships to assist operational policing exist where appropriate, for example, Local Criminal Justice Board (LCJB), UK Border Agency (UKBA), National Offender Management Service (NOMS)</li> <li>10 Consider partnership funding applications where resource gaps are identified in action plans, eg OSCT Objective 2 and 3 funds, CLG Challenge and Innovation fund</li> </ol>

<b>Strategic priority</b>	<b>Ensuring outcomes</b>
<b>Objective</b>	The police authority should satisfy itself that local <i>Prevent</i> interventions are delivered effectively and that output and outcome measures are set in the Force <i>Prevent</i> Plan in order to report effectively on national indicators, including Analysis of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) and National Indicator 35 (NI35)
<b>Priority actions (PA)</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Ensure the force is engaged in partnerships to identify and provide support to vulnerable individuals and disrupt those who promote violent extremism</li> <li>2 Can the force demonstrate that the pattern of engagement in preventative activity is in line with the identified risk across the area covered by the CTU/CTIU where applicable?</li> <li>3 Police are engaged in a clearly tasked strategic partnership with local authorities and other partners to deliver an effective programme of action</li> <li>4 The force has mechanisms to measure and review performance</li> <li>5 Local <i>Prevent</i> partnership action plans have measurable outcomes and targets</li> <li>6 Qualitative assessment of <i>Prevent</i> impact is undertaken through consultation and engagement</li> <li>7 Project impacts and outcomes are considered through evaluation processes</li> </ol>

## Using the strategic framework priorities and actions

It is not suggested that all of the priority actions should be adopted by all police authorities, and it is not intended to represent an exhaustive list of all actions on *Prevent* that authorities might take. An indicative example of a suggested level of activity for authorities in areas ranging from low to high priority based on the framework is provided in the chart below.

Ultimately the level of police authority *Prevent* activity, both in terms of independent activity and the level and extent of its scrutiny and oversight of the force delivery on *Prevent* will be dependent on a detailed knowledge and understanding of local risks and circumstances, knowledge of effective practice to respond to those risks and circumstances, and sufficient resources to implement the response.



# Appendix 1 National, regional and local *Prevent* partners

## 1a Policing

In April 2008 ACPO produced the 'Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism', a national strategy and delivery plan which set out the police service contribution to *Prevent*. This was followed in September 2008 by 'The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism Implementation Plan',<sup>19</sup> published to translate national strategy into practical activities for all levels in the police service.

### **ACPO *Prevent* Implementation Plan – implications for police authorities**

Also set out within the Police Implementation Plan are a number of activities where police authorities are named as delivery partners, including at BCU, force and regional (CTC/CTU/CTIU) level:

- ensuring the force has a strategic lead at ACPO rank;
- ensuring BCUs have a lead officer accountable for embedding *Prevent* in neighbourhood policing;
- force presents performance information on *Prevent* to police authority;
- BCU works with local partners in ensuring appropriate engagement strategy and mechanisms;
- force and police authority have systems for complaints concerning police enforcement of CT legislation;
- monitoring of Schedule 7 Port TACT Examinations, S33 TACT cordons, S44 and S43 TACT stops with a view to assessing their impact on the BME community;
- developing a consequence management plan which considers the potential negative impact of enforcement activity on the local community; and
- force provides regular briefings to the police authority about the vulnerability to

radicalisation for violent extremism within the force area, and briefs the authority following any CT operations.

## 1b *Prevent* policing resources

In addition to the establishment of additional CTUs and CTIUs under Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) funding, significant funding was initially given in 2008/09 to 24 priority areas for specific *Prevent* policing posts. 166 posts were recruited to these forces, including *Prevent* Co-ordinator, Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officer and Community Engagement Officer posts. Additional CSR funding has been agreed for 2009/10 to support previously unfunded forces and areas of increased vulnerability.

In addition to this funding for the establishment of core costs, additional funding has been made available from OSCT, particularly under Objective 2 & 3 funding. These include funding for:

- Channel Project in 28 sites in 12 forces;
- Operation Nicole delivery;
- police *Prevent* activity within schools, colleges and universities; and
- support to work of Prison Intelligence Officers and Analysts within Special Branches of individual forces.

## 1c *Prevent* policing governance, management and delivery

An overarching government Contest Board provides oversight of delivery of the strategy, and includes police representation. The police are also represented on the cross-government *Prevent* Sub-board which has responsibility for overseeing and managing the delivery of the national *Prevent* work programme.<sup>20</sup> The National ACPO *Prevent* Programme Board is specifically responsible for delivering the police contribution to *Prevent* and reports to the ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters (TAM) Committee.

<sup>19</sup> ACPO, *Prevent: The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism; Implementation Plan*, September 2008, RESTRICTED document ACPO, *Prevent: The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism; Implementation Plan – a Summary for Partners*, February 2009. <http://Prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/assets/pdf/ACPO%20Prevent%20PIP.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> See HM Government, *The Prevent Strategy: a Guide for Local partners in England for the National Governance Structure* <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/Prevent-strategy-part-2?view=Binary> p.68

### **1d ACPO National Prevent Delivery Unit**

The National *Prevent* Delivery Unit (NPDU) in ACPO (TAM) is the central unit supporting delivery of the National Policing *Prevent* Programme. NPDU staff have a number of areas of national responsibility including:

- **Channel Project;**
- **Counter-terrorism local profiles;**<sup>21</sup>
- **Regional coordination;**
- ***Prevent* communications;**
- **Community tensions;**
- **Operation Nicole;** and
- ***Prevent/Pursue* overlap**

#### **1e Ongoing developments in delivery of *Prevent* policing**

ACPO will be producing a *Prevent* Development Plan for 2009-11 focusing on:

- mainstreaming *Prevent* within everyday policing.
- establishing what works and sharing the learning; and
- developing a means to monitor and measure progress and success.

This will build upon the key *Prevent* priorities established for 2009/10 focusing on the following five key areas:

- **embedding *Prevent*** – increasing development of *Prevent* in neighbourhood policing teams to facilitate greater engagement with partners in delivery of local partnership *Prevent* action plans;
- **Partnership interventions** – developing a range of partnership interventions and mechanisms for referral and support for vulnerable individuals;
- ***Prevent/Pursue* overlap** – maximising opportunities to disrupt radicalising individuals and monitoring impact of

*Pursue* on *Prevent*;

- **Information sharing** – increasing information flow internally and with partners; and
- ***Prevent* capability and capacity building** – strengthening support for local delivery and utilising the *Prevent* Implementation Plan to monitor effectiveness.

Other areas of the strategy will continue to be supported and developed.

#### **1f *Prevent/Pursue* overlap<sup>22</sup>**

A *Prevent/Pursue* overlap working group has been established to inform the view of how forces and other agencies are performing in this area, and the work of this group will be of significant interest for police authorities in monitoring the impact of *Prevent* policing. Areas of work include:

- **OSCT-led work looking at the impact of counter-terrorism activity on the community;**
- **assessing the impact of s44 and Sch. 7 stops on the community;**
- **work with UKBA to embed *Prevent* procedures into the UKBA CT referrals process;** and
- **development of guidance for police and partners for the CT decision process in relation to radicalisers below threshold of *Pursue* and vulnerable individuals on periphery of *Pursue*.**

<sup>21</sup> See HM Government, *National Guidance on Counter Terrorism Local Profiles for BCU Commanders and Local Authority Chief Executives*, April 2009, RESTRICTED document

<sup>22</sup> ACPO/OSCT, *National Guidance on *Prevent* Case Management*, August 2009 RESTRICTED document

## 1g Prevent policing structure and governance



<sup>23</sup> For information on the governmental governance structure for *Prevent* see *HM Government Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England*, June 2008, p68. <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/Prevent-strategy/>

## 1h Government

### Role of national government departments<sup>23</sup>

As identified above, OSCT now has a leadership and co-ordination role on *Prevent*, but there are many significant contributions to the development of *Prevent* policy and the facilitation of *Prevent* delivery across Whitehall.

Central government departments and related bodies involved in supporting the *Prevent* agenda include:

- the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism and the wider Home Office;
- Communities and Local Government (CLG);
- Welsh Assembly Government (WAG);
- the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO);
- the Research and Communications Unit (RICU), within OSCT;
- the Department for International Development (DFID);
- the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (DBIS);
- the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF);
- the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS);
- the Ministry of Justice (MoJ);
- Youth Justice Board (YJB);
- the Department of Health (DH);
- the United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA); and
- the Government Offices (GOs).

Outlined overleaf is a brief description of each department's *Prevent* responsibilities, contribution and support.

### **Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT)**

The Office for Security and Counter Terrorism is part of the Home Office. It has responsibility for coordinating activity to deliver the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, working closely with the police, security services, and other partners. It is the central coordinating point for guidance and support on the *Prevent* agenda for all those involved. OSCT *Prevent* is divided into the *Prevent* central unit and the *Prevent* interventions unit. The *Prevent* central unit provides strategic support to ensure effective delivery of all objectives of the strategy. The *Prevent* interventions unit focuses on objectives 2 and 3, working with local partners to disrupt those who promote violent extremism, provide support to the institutions affected by extremism, and support vulnerable individuals.

### **Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU)**

The Research, Information and Communications Unit exists to counter the impact of terrorist propaganda and to ensure that the government has a positive impact in its communications. RICU is a counter-terrorism strategic communications unit, owned jointly by the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and is staffed from all three Departments, as well as a range of departments and agencies across Whitehall and beyond. It forms part of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism in the Home Office.

### **Communities and Local Government (CLG)**

Communities and Local Government is responsible for leading the community-based response to violent extremism. It works to build the capacity of British Muslim communities and wider society to resist and challenge the activities and ideas of violent extremists. CLG manages the PVE Pathfinder Fund, Community Leadership Fund, and Challenge and Innovation Fund.

### **Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)**

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office leads on international delivery, working with international organisations, foreign governments and international mainstream voices. The FCO also works with CLG on outreach to domestic Muslim communities, in particular to engage in a dialogue on foreign policy issues. International delivery is focused in countries where action will have an impact on UK security.

### **Department for Children Schools and Families (DCSF)**

The Department for Children Schools and Families contributes to building the resilience of children and young people to extremist messages. It manages the risk of radicalisation in schools and contributes to the development of *Prevent* project policy nationally from a safeguarding perspective. DCSF has produced the schools toolkit on extremism, 'Learning Together to be Safe', which police assist in the delivery of locally.

### **Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS)**

Formerly the Department for Innovation Universities and Skills, DBIS is responsible for supporting the development of the higher education (HE) and further education (FE) sectors' contribution to tackling violent extremism. It does this by providing national guidance developed in consultation with these sectors, working with student bodies to develop their capacity to protect and support students against violent extremist influences and establishing improved structures for support and advice between the police and these sectors.

### **Department for International Development (DFID)**

The Department for International Development aims to help reduce poverty overseas. It contributes to *Prevent* by helping to address the underlying social and economic causes of

radicalisation through international development work often involving work visits of British Muslims to developing countries. DFID produces a range of country-specific newsletters to communicate the development work of the UK Government overseas to Muslims in the UK.

### **United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA)**

The aim of *Prevent* within the UK Border Agency is to help reduce the risk of individuals going through the UKBA systems becoming or supporting terrorists whilst offering support to those vulnerable to radicalisation from extremists. Key work on *Prevent* within UKBA has been focused on the citizenship process, supporting asylum seekers and refugees, managed migration, immigration detention, migration research and immigration policy. UKBA also provides CT training and awareness raising within these areas. UKBA is currently working to develop processes to link with Channel Project referral systems and intends to make referrals of *Prevent* cases.

### **Ministry of Justice (MoJ)**

The Ministry of Justice aims to protect the public and reduce re-offending. The MoJ is working to manage the risks posed by Al-Qaida influenced offenders. National Offender Management Service (NOMS) is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice, bringing together the headquarters of the Probation Service and HM Prison Service. NOMS have a responsibility not only in relation to TACT prisoners, but also prisoners who may be vulnerable to radicalisation while in custody. The probation service have a role in respect of TACT prisoners on licence and the delivery of offender management interventions.

### **Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)**

The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) promotes the cultural, creative and sporting sectors in developing a common sense of shared values and identity. These sectors also present a modern and progressive image of British

society both in this country and overseas, and enable young people to pursue interests and develop talent.

### **Department of Health (DoH)**

The Department of Health is actively involved in a range of national policy development work on *Prevent*, including developing information sharing between the healthcare environment and police and security services. DoH has been working to raise awareness amongst health professionals locally in relation to indicators of radicalization and the potential role of health professionals in contributing to the support of individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation.

DoH are establishing a *Prevent* lead in each strategic health authority, and in some areas have been involved in Channel Projects.

### **Youth Justice Board (YJB)**

The YJB has a PVE fund which provides funding for over 40 programmes nationally, both within a custodial and non-custodial environment.

### **Welsh Assembly Government (WAG)**

Responsibility for the *Prevent* strategy in the Welsh Assembly Government rests with the Community Cohesion Unit, but it also cuts across other ministries within WAG.

## **Regional level**

### **1i Policing**

A number of police forces have been involved in the establishment of CTUs and CTIUs since 2006 which are one of the primary regional bodies responsible for *Prevent* delivery and CT operations more broadly.

In addition to CTC (SO15) in the Metropolitan police, in the last few years additional CTUs have been established in West Yorkshire (Leeds), Greater Manchester (Manchester), West Midlands (Birmingham) and Thames Valley (Reading). CTIUs, which do not have the full range of function and

capability of CTUs, and are focused primarily on intelligence, are situated in Essex, Avon and Somerset, East Midlands, and Wales (Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit [WECTU]).

CTUs and CTIUs are tasked with maintaining oversight and management of *Prevent* policing activity across each region, providing intelligence and support to forces and BCUs in the delivery of *Prevent*.

Each CTU/CTIU has a Police Regional *Prevent* Delivery Manager. The National *Prevent* Business Change Manager, head of the NPDU, chairs six-weekly meetings with the Regional *Prevent* Managers. In turn the Regional *Prevent* Managers meet with force *Prevent* leads.

Each force has a *Prevent* lead of ACPO rank, and should have a board in place with responsibility for monitoring delivery of *Prevent* activity across the force area. Police authorities should be represented on this force board.

### 1j Government Offices (GOs)

Central departments and agencies will have a presence and function in relation to regional delivery, and this is primarily managed through the GOs in the regions. GOs are the primary means by which a range of government policies and programmes are delivered, including *Prevent*, and all of the Whitehall departments working on *Prevent* mentioned above are represented in the regional GOs.

GOs now have regional *Prevent* Delivery Managers with responsibility for supporting and overseeing the multi-agency delivery of *Prevent* across their respective regions, and who should work closely with the Police Regional *Prevent* Delivery Managers to facilitate this delivery.

GOs manage the strategic relationship on *Prevent* between central government and localities including:

- **encouraging local *Prevent* partnership activity, eg advisory and support role in implementing the DCFS extremism toolkit;**
  - **facilitating partnership relations at a local and regional level, eg regular regional *Prevent* partner meetings and network events;**
  - **elements of performance management on *Prevent*, eg collating local authority and force OSCT Tracker returns; and**
  - **serving as a conduit for local partnership bids for *Prevent* funding, eg OSCT Objective 2 & 3 funding and CLG Challenge and Innovation Fund.**
- Dependent on the role and level of involvement that individual police authorities have adopted in relation to *Prevent*, they therefore will wish to consider developing a relationship in respect of *Prevent* with GOs on the basis that:
- **as a strategic *Prevent* partner the police authority would be a key member of GO *Prevent* regional meetings and networks;**
  - **one of GO roles on *Prevent* is to facilitate the interface between police and other local partners which is a key function for some police authorities;**
  - **police authorities often do not have direct access to central government *Prevent* funds for work they might like to develop, but could do so through partnership networks through GOs;**
  - **access to sub-regional information on, for example, impacts of *Prevent* policing on communities; and**
  - **GO networks/meetings could provide an ideal opportunity for police authorities to access all the local authority partners within the force area in one forum.**
- As a minimum all police authorities should consider how a developed relationship with GOs

- **co-ordination role between central government departments and local partners, eg monitoring of CLG PVE fund;**

and involvement in regional *Prevent* meetings might enhance their knowledge and understanding of regional *Prevent* delivery, and therefore their ability to hold to account the force.

### **1k Regional partners**

Other regional partners that have a stakeholder role within *Prevent* include Local Criminal Justice Boards, the Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnership and National Offender Management Service Regional Offender Managers (Director of Offender Management in Wales).

### **Local level**

#### **1l Policing**

Many BCUs have been involved at a local level in CLG PVE pathfinder fund areas since October 2006, playing an active partnership role in the development of local plans and projects.

Forces and BCUs have been invited to adapt the ACPO Police Implementation Plan for use as a local action planning tool in developing *Prevent* strategy and delivery. A summary of the Police Implementation Plan has also been published for partners outlining the police *Prevent* delivery framework to partners, and particularly on the range of activities that forces and BCUs can contribute to local *Prevent* partnerships

Clearly police authorities will need to familiarise themselves with the details of the plan which relate to a broad range of force activity, including the establishment of *Prevent* leads, assimilating *Prevent* into neighbourhood policing teams, consulting and engaging with partners and communities in setting local priorities, information sharing, developing and delivering interventions, and communications.

Each BCU has a *Prevent* lead responsible for local *Prevent* policing, and those forces in receipt of CSR funding due to higher levels of 'risk' have Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officers and Community Engagement Officers working specifically on *Prevent*.

### **1m Local delivery partners**

Where *Prevent* partnerships have been developing over the last few years, particularly those areas that have received CLG PVE pathfinder funding, there has been engagement of a broad range of partners, including both statutory and community and voluntary sector organisations. This has included:

- a range of local authority services, including adult services, youth services including Youth Offending Teams, and schools;
- colleges and universities;
- arts and cultural delivery bodies including libraries and sports centres;
- Probation Service;
- Fire and Rescue Service;
- primary care trusts;
- community and voluntary sectors; and
- Council of Faiths.

Local delivery partners and their responsibilities will ostensibly match the associated national government department role, so for example Children's Services Departments and schools have a key role in the delivery of the DCFS toolkit on extremism.

#### **1n The role of local partners**

The National *Prevent* Strategy recommends that a partnership group should be clearly tasked to take forward local action on *Prevent*. Local authorities and the police should take the lead and ensure other partners from the statutory and voluntary sector are involved.

Updated guidance to the *Prevent* Strategy<sup>24</sup> which builds on the *Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England* has been published by HM Government. This provides partners with additional practical advice for delivering the *Prevent* strategy at a local level. Other documents recently

**24** <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/updated-guide-for-local-partners?view=Binary>

published include an update of *Delivering the Prevent Strategy: Practical Steps for Local Partners*<sup>25</sup> and an associated document, *Delivering the Prevent Strategy, Guidance 2: Good Practice Examples*,<sup>26</sup> which details emerging practice in partnership delivery.

Guidance sets out two main requirements, that each area should have:

- **a clearly-tasked and well-represented partnership to take forward the *Prevent* agenda;** and
- **a jointly agreed and managed programme of action addressing all seven objectives of the *Prevent* Strategy, which is proportionate to the local risk.**

Government guidance requires local *Prevent* partnerships to undertake a 'strategic assessment', which matches an analysis of the local threat against local vulnerability, thereby giving an indication of the local risk. CTLPs should primarily inform this process, and by August 2009 at the latest all BCU Commanders and local authority chief executives will have been provided with a restricted CTLP.

Local authorities and the police are then responsible for ensuring that the local action plan:

- **meets the seven objectives of the *Prevent* Strategy;**
- **is jointly agreed and managed by the police, local authority and other partners;**
- **is proportionate to the level of threat in the area;**
- **reflects local needs;** and
- **sets out clear and tangible milestones in tracking progress.**

Police authorities will want to familiarise themselves with the range of partnership *Prevent* action plans in their force area. Areas clearly face different levels of risk and therefore partnership

strategies and action plans might vary from a commitment to regularly reassess the level of risk to robust and detailed programmes addressing all national *Prevent* strategy objectives.

All areas will need to demonstrate a minimum level of activity and a proportionate response in certain areas may be the ownership of *Prevent* by a strategic partnership and processes to assess risk, including identifying emerging issues and reassessment of risk. A proportionate response in higher risk areas will require detailed programmes of activity to address the *Prevent* strategy objectives.

In addition, the HMIC and Audit Commission Learning and Development Exercise<sup>27</sup> identified the need for processes for partnership working to take account of regional and national partners, as well as partners at a local level.

## **1o Local *Prevent* governance and structures**

*Prevent* partnerships locally are at various stages of development, and as the HMIC report on *Prevent* indicates, display varying levels of 'maturity'.

The governance and management structures for *Prevent* work differs also, although primarily *Prevent* is now located within the local CDRP structure, and so should automatically involve police authority representation. In a smaller number of areas *Prevent* may be located within a community cohesion partnership structure, but this should still be part of a broader Local Strategic Partnership framework which police authorities should be members of.

Membership of *Prevent* partnerships at a strategic level will give police authorities an opportunity to assess the relationship between the force and its key *Prevent* partners from an oversight perspective, as well as assist in the strategic development of the local *Prevent* partnership. Tensions and conflicting opinion on *Prevent* approaches do exist within *Prevent* partnerships locally, and police authority members are in a position to address and

**25** HM Government, *Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners*, June 2009 <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/updated-guide-for-local-partners?view=Binary>

**26** *Delivering the Prevent Strategy, Guidance 2: Good Practice Examples*, June 2009 <http://Prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/assets/pdf/Delivering%20Prevent%202%20June%2020091.pdf>

**27** HMIC and Audit Commission, *Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise*, October 2008

alleviate any concerns that partners might have about policing approaches.

Where partnerships are demonstrating levels of success in relation to *Prevent* management and delivery, a number of features have been identified by OSCT research:<sup>28</sup>

- **a clear, jointly-managed oversight and delivery structure which sets out responsibilities at both strategic and delivery level;**
- **appropriate partners represented at each level;**
- **a clear joint decision-making and commissioning process;**
- **jointly agreed aims and objectives and are delivering work together;** and
- **working across geographical boundaries, acknowledging that communities span administrative units and learning from neighbouring partnerships.**

Similarly in the *Prevent* inspection report<sup>29</sup> HMIC see 'mature partnerships' being characterised by;

- **highly-developed information sharing;**
- **strong links between police management teams and partners;** and
- **joint working focused on *Prevent*.**

Police authorities are listed as one of the key regional and local partners in the national *Prevent* strategy, and should play a role working with GOs and local authority leaders in ensuring that effective local governance arrangements are in place across *Prevent* partnerships.

**28** *Delivering the Prevent Strategy, Guidance 2: Good Practice Examples*, June 2009, p3  
<http://Prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/assets/pdf/Delivering%20Prevent%20June%2020091.pdf>

**29** HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, *Prevent – Progress and Prospects*, July 2009, p3  
<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections/thematic/Prevent-report/Prevent-report?view=Binary>

# Appendix 2 *Prevent* performance monitoring

## 2a Success criteria for the effective delivery of *Prevent* policing

The Home Office has worked with ACPO to develop 'success criteria' in relation to the police and *Prevent*, circulated to chief constables in August 2008.

### ACPO measures of success

**1** Forces, including at the local policing level, will have a Rich Picture understanding of their communities and use effective processes for gathering and sharing information with partners.

**2** Forces will have an understanding of risk levels of violent extremism within their areas.

**3** Neighbourhood policing teams will be trained, briefed and tasked to produce 'neighbourhood profiles', guided by the minimum standards produced by ACPO, and support *Prevent* in engagement work with the community.

**4** Police are engaged in a clearly tasked strategic partnership with local authorities and other partners to deliver an effective programme of action, that:

- meets the specific objectives of the *Prevent* strategy;
- is jointly agreed and managed by police, local authorities and other partners;
- is proportionate to the level of threat in the area;
- reflects local needs; and
- sets out clear and tangible milestones for tracking progress.

**5** Where proportionate, these programmes of action will have joint interventions with partners to:

- identify and provide support to vulnerable individuals;

- disrupt those who promote violent extremism;
- work with institutions where radicalisers may be active; and
- support sections of communities to resist the challenge from radicalisers.

**6** There will be evidence of effective collaboration between police forces and regional CT hubs and GOs in the use of intelligence to inform different *Prevent* strategies and interventions.

**7** Forces will have appointed a *Prevent* Strategic Lead (likely to be ACPO rank) who oversees effective governance arrangements to deliver and embed *Prevent* activity within a force's core policing business.

**8** Forces and regional hubs will have mechanisms to review and improve their performance against *Prevent* Analysis of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) indicators – Key Diagnostic Indicators (KDIs) NI35, Rich Picture, disruptions and CT taskings.

**9** Forces in receipt of CSR funding will have established *Prevent* police posts in place performing the complementary community engagement and intelligence roles. In the case of forces within which CTUs/CTC are located, this will include regional co-ordination posts.

All forces are required to provide a self-assessment of progress on the implementation of *Prevent* activities through the Regional *Prevent* Delivery Co-ordinator to the ACPO National *Prevent* Delivery Unit on a six weekly basis. This reporting process relates to the nine ACPO success criteria for *Prevent* policing. Police authorities should utilise reporting information from forces on these measures.

## 2b National Indicator Set and APACS

Police authorities will also want to consider broader performance monitoring arrangements in relation to *Prevent* including APACS<sup>30</sup> and NI35.<sup>31</sup>

NI35 (Building resilience to violent extremism) and NI36<sup>32</sup> (Protection against terrorist attack) are national indicators relating to counter-terrorism work carried out by the police in partnership with local authorities. These two national indicators are also included within a set of APACS counter-terrorism indicators which is not public.

APACS includes National Performance Indicators, and a range of KDIs relating to counter-terrorism, including *Prevent* – these are summarised below:

### Counter-terrorism KDIs:

- **Rich Picture** – assessment of each force's contribution to Rich Picture understanding;
- **counter-terrorism investigations** – assessments through regional Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group;
- **disruptions** – number of disruptions to terrorist networks; and
- **hazardous sites** – reducing the vulnerability of hazardous sites to terrorist attack.

In addition to the indicators specifically relating to counter-terrorism, domestic extremism and *Prevent*, police authorities may also want to take account of performance indicators relating to communities. For example:

- **monitoring user satisfaction and public confidence data;**
- **measures relating to fairness and equality;**
- **assessing data relating to stop and search, and monitoring disproportionality;** and
- **the monitoring of complaints against the police will also be necessary to get a more rounded picture of any growing concerns amongst communities.**

These more qualitative assessments will provide a more comprehensive view of the relationship between communities and the police. Police authorities should ensure the range of information available to them is constantly utilised to help them identify any emerging concerns from within communities.

<sup>30</sup> <http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance-and-measurement/assess-policing-community-safety/>

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/747537.pdf>

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/pdf/735115.pdf> p63-4

# Appendix 3 HMIC *Prevent* summary

## 3a HMIC Inspection: *Prevent – Progress and Prospects*

HMIC have recently published *Prevent – Progress and Prospects* following a thematic inspection on *Prevent* across all forces. Within the report HMIC set out clear recommendations which relate to the areas for priority action in the refreshed ACPO strategy.

The general summary of the report is that forces are in 'different stages of implementation and that *Prevent* is not as sophisticated or developed as other areas of business.'<sup>33</sup> In relation to work with partners the report notes that whilst there are signs that some progress has been made, there is still work to be done to improve local information sharing and *Prevent*-focused partnership working.

In relation specifically to the role of police authorities within *Prevent*, the report states that they have a 'key role in supporting delivery of the Police *Prevent* Strategy, for example by providing effective oversight of performance and promoting *Prevent* within their consultations with communities.'<sup>34</sup>

The report goes on to state that the inspection identified that the 'vast majority of police authorities demonstrate some engagement with *Prevent*, although the degree of knowledge, active participation and oversight varies'. The report also states that 'there are examples of police authorities leading community engagement and establishing relationships with strategic partners on *Prevent*', but that the majority of police authorities are 'satisfied with constructive *Prevent* engagement by their forces.'<sup>35</sup>

Recommendations for *Prevent* include:

- **prioritising future investment and support to areas with higher levels of risk where mature partnerships could support the delivery of *Prevent*;**
- **defining minimum levels of *Prevent* capability according to local levels of risk, to be achieved by forces before 31 March 2010;**
- **agreeing guidance for forces and local partners on restrictions and permissions provided by different levels of vetting, and permitted access to different levels of Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS) information;**
- **establishing formal mechanisms for the dissemination of case studies and good practice;** and
- **developing a centralised resource for developing performance frameworks for *Prevent*.**

**33** HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, *Prevent – Progress and Prospects*, July 2009, p2  
<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections/thematic/Prevent-report/Prevent-report?view=Binary>

**34** Ibid. p18

**35** Ibid. p18

# Appendix 4 Glossary

## Act Now

ACT Now (All Communities Together) is a desk top exercise hosted by the police that allows community groups to play the role of police officers in a developing terrorist incident. The exercise generates debate about issues such as when police should take action in a complex situation and how they should deal with community issues that result from the incident. The exercise is designed to take place in a safe and confidential community setting in which the extremely sensitive issues around terrorism can be discussed.

## ACPO National Prevent Delivery Unit

The National *Prevent* Delivery Unit in ACPO (TAM) is the central unit supporting delivery of the National Policing *Prevent* Programme. NPDU staff have a number of areas of national responsibility in support of the ACPO 'Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism' strategy.

## ACPO (TAM)

The business area of ACPO which deals with terrorism, extremism and associated issues.

## Al-Qaida

Al-Qaida is an Islamist group founded sometime between August 1988 and late 1989/early 1990. It operates as a network comprising both a multinational, stateless arm and a fundamentalist Sunni movement. Al-Qaida's objectives include the end of foreign influence in Muslim countries and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate. Reported beliefs include that a Christian-Jewish alliance is conspiring to destroy Islam, and that the killing of bystanders and civilians is religiously justified in jihad.

## APACS

The Analysis of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) framework is a performance measurement framework. It was introduced in April 2008 as Assessments of Policing and Community Safety but

was subsequently renamed to reflect changes outlined in the Policing Green Paper. It applies to all police forces in England and Wales, covering key services delivered by the police working on their own or in partnership with others.

## CEO (*Prevent* Community Engagement Officer)

A CEO is one of the primary posts funded through ACPO in priority force areas to develop engagement activity with local communities in relation to *Prevent*.

## Challenge and Innovation Fund

The Challenge and Innovation Fund is managed by CLG and is intended to support work that largely reflects activities under Objectives 1, 4 and 5 of the Government's *Prevent* strategy.

## Channel Project

Channel is a multi-agency process, which provides support to those individuals who may be vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists. It works by providing a mechanism for:

- identifying individuals who may be at risk of and vulnerable to being drawn into violent extremism;
- assessing the nature and extent of the risk; and
- where necessary, referring cases to a multi agency panel which decides on the most appropriate support package to divert and protect the individual at risk.

## Community cohesion

There are a range of different definitions of community cohesion, but they all largely encompass the following objectives within them:

- awareness of the need to eliminate social, economic and educational inequalities (in particular those related to ethnic group);
- promotion of good relations between and within communities;

- promotion of civic and political engagement; and
- valuing difference.

### **Community Leadership Fund**

The Community Leadership Fund is managed by CLG and aims to support Muslim communities to tackle violent extremism through building community resilience by developing the leadership skills of women, young people and faith leaders, and encouraging active, positive involvement in public life.

### **Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR)**

The Comprehensive Spending Review is the Government's main tool for deciding on the allocation of money to public services. In 2008/09 around £12m for *Prevent* was allocated across 24 priority forces, and regional CTUs and CTIUs.

### **CONTEST**

CONTEST is the name of the UK Government's counter-terrorism strategy. The official objective of the strategy is 'to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence'. It has four main workstreams – Pursue, *Prevent*, Protect and Prepare.

### **Counter-terrorism**

Counter-terrorism refers to the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in response to terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed.

### **Counter-Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP)**

A Counter Terrorism Local Profile is an intelligence assessments of a police Basic Command Unit area and inform BCU commanders, local authority chief executives and other agreed partnership members of the potential threats and vulnerabilities from violent extremism. The CTLP provides recommendations to counter risks and vulnerabilities so that a combined use of police and partnership resources can be implemented to provide Preventative action.

### **Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC)**

Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) or SO15 is a Specialist Operations branch within London's Metropolitan Police Service. Counter Terrorism Command was established as a result of the merging of the Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13), and the Special Branch in 2006, to form a single counter-terrorism investigative unit. The command brings together intelligence analysis and development with investigations and operational support activity.

### **Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Unit (CTIU)**

There are five CTIUs based within Hertfordshire, Avon and Somerset, East Midlands, Sussex and Wales. They do not have the full range of function and capability of CTUs, and are focused primarily on intelligence.

### **Counter-Terrorism Oversight Group (CTOG)**

The national oversight group for the five CTUs and four CTIUs formed of representatives of the host police authorities.

### **Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU)**

There are four counter-terrorism units based in Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham and Reading with a remit to ensure that the police service in the UK is better equipped to *Prevent* or respond to terrorist incidents and to investigate and prosecute those involved.

They deliver essential, specialist support to police throughout the country, and draw on a wide range of expertise including: skilled detectives, financial investigators, community contact teams, intelligence analysts, forensic specialists and high-tech investigators.

### **Prevent Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officer (CTIO)**

A CTIO is one of the primary posts funded through ACPO in priority force areas, and located in Special Branch, to develop *Prevent*-related intelligence.

### **Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs)**

CDRPs are local partnerships made up of the responsible authorities, and have a statutory duty to work with other local agencies and organisations to develop and implement strategies to tackle crime and disorder including anti-social and other behaviour adversely affecting the local environment as well as the misuse of drugs in their area. The development of *Prevent* partnerships and action plans locally is often located within the CDRP.

### **Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs)**

In Wales there are 22 CSPs, equivalent to CDRPs in England.

### **DIUS guidance (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, now DBIS, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills)**

In 2008 DIUS produced guidance to higher and further education institutions on the role that these organisations can play in preventing violent extremism.

### **Domestic extremism**

Unlike terrorism, which is defined in the UK by the Terrorism Act 2000, there is no equivalent legal definition for domestic extremism. The terms are generally used to describe the activity, individuals or campaign groups that carry out criminal acts of direct action in furtherance of a campaign. These people and activities usually seek to *Prevent* something from happening or to change legislation or domestic policy, but attempt to do so outside of the normal democratic process.

### **Equality Impact Assessment *Prevent* (EIA *Prevent*)**

Police forces are required to undertake an equality impact assessment in relation to *Prevent*.

### **Government Offices (GOs)**

GOs are the primary means by which a range of government policies and programmes are delivered in the English regions

### **Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS)**

The GPMS is the Government's administrative system to ensure that access to information and other assets is correctly managed and safeguarded to an agreed and proportionate level throughout their lifecycle, including creation, storage, transmission and destruction. The system is designed to support HMG business, and meet the requirements of relevant legislation, international standards and international agreements.

### **Intelligence and Community Engagement (ICE) Training**

This learning is intended for police officers, community support officers, police staff and their partners who work together in a neighbourhood team. The principal aim is to improve knowledge and understanding of intelligence capture through community engagement. This training is a requirement of the counter-terrorism national police *Prevent* Strategy.

### **Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)**

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was created as the UK's centre for the analysis and assessment of international terrorism. It was established in June 2003 and is based in the Security Service's headquarters at Thames House in London. It analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets threat levels and issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a wide range of government departments and agencies, as well as producing more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist networks and capabilities.

### **KDI**

APACS Key Diagnostic Indicator

### **Learning Together to be Safe Toolkit**

Originally produced by the Department for Children, Schools and Families, a version has also been adapted for use by further education colleges.

The toolkit gives background information on the threat from violent extremist groups of various kinds and on what might make young people vulnerable, in addition to practical advice and exercises for building resilience and managing risks.

### **Local Criminal Justice Board (LCJB)**

LCJBs were set up in April 2003 to manage the criminal justice system (CJS) at a local level and to ensure all criminal justice agencies are working together to tackle crime. These boards bring together the chief officers of the CJS agencies to co-ordinate activity and share responsibility for delivering criminal justice in their areas. They report to the National Criminal Justice Board (NCJB) which brings together ministers and senior officials across Government. The NCJB supports LCJBs in their work to meet Public Service Agreement targets at a local level to bring more offences to justice and increase public confidence in the CJS.

### **Local Strategic Partnership (LSP)**

The LSP brings together at a local level the different parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors so that different initiatives and services support each other and work together. It is a non-statutory partnership providing a single overarching local co-ordination framework within which other partnerships can operate, and is responsible for developing and driving the implementation of the Sustainable Community Strategy and the Local Area Agreement.

### **National Community Tension Team (NCTT)**

The National Community Tension Team is an ACPO unit monitoring community tension issues across the UK and acting as a point of liaison and assistance for both police bodies and external organisations.

### **NI35 (National Indicator 35)**

NI35, 'Building resilience to violent extremism' is part of the National Indicator Set, and measures local area work in relation to:

- understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities;
- knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of violent extremism and the *Prevent* objectives;
- development of a risk-based preventing violent extremism action plan, in support of delivery of the *Prevent* objectives; and
- effective oversight, delivery and evaluation of projects and actions.

### **NI36 (National Indicator 36)**

NI 36, 'Protection against terrorist attack' is specifically about reducing the vulnerability of crowded places from terrorist attack. The assessment is a measure of 1 to 5, where 1 is very low level of vulnerability and 5 is very high level.

### **Operation Element**

NCTT receive information from a wide range of sources about tension issues that might have an impact in the UK, and collate this into an intelligence bulletin that gets circulated to all police forces and a range of other stakeholders, including government departments. This bulletin is known as Operation Element.

### **Operation Nicole**

Operation Nicole is a police *Prevent* initiative that allows community members to take on the role of a senior police officer investigating a terrorist incident. It is an exercise that aims to give the police an insight into the community impact of counter terrorist policing, and give community members an insight into the decisions that the police have to make during investigations.

### **OSCT Tracker**

The quarterly *Prevent* Tracker was developed by OSCT to monitor the progress of *Prevent* Local Delivery and provide a national overview. It contains factual information on the status of local area's *Prevent* partnerships, plans and projects.

Each of the Government Offices submits this information for their region together with a RAG rated subjective assessment of each local area's performance on the seven *Prevent* Objectives. OSCT collate the nine regional trackers into a national report. For more information contact **prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk**

### **Prepare**

The workstream of CONTEST managing for where an attack cannot be stopped, its impact is mitigated.

### **Prevent**

The workstream of CONTEST aiming to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism

### **Prevent action plans**

*Prevent* action plans are partnership developed plans to address the objectives of the National *Prevent* Strategy at a local level, most typically on a local authority geographical area.

### **Protect**

The workstream of CONTEST concerned with strengthening our protection against terrorist attack.

### **Pursue**

The workstream of Contest designed to stop terrorist attacks.

### **Public Service Agreement (PSA) 26**

PSAs set out the Government's performance management framework for the present Comprehensive Spending Review period. PSA26 aims to 'Reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism' and is connected to the delivery arrangements for the CONTEST Strategy.

### **PVE Pathfinder Fund (PVEPF)**

The PVEPF was launched in October 2006 in order to support priority local authorities in developing

programmes of activity to tackle violent extremism at a local level. Seventy local authorities across England were identified as priority areas in the pathfinder year and received funding of £6m pounds between them. A further £45m will be provided to local authorities between 2008 and 2011.

### **Rich Picture**

Both force Special Branches and regional CTUs gather information as part of the Rich Picture intelligence requirement. Rich Picture introduces a planned, structured and sustained process to support the collection of intelligence at a local level to aid understanding of the make-up and dynamics of local communities where radicalisation could occur.

### **Risk**

The level of susceptibility to violent extremism or terrorism.

### **Schedule 7 Port TACT examinations**

Allows an examining officer, including a constable, an immigration officer or customs officer, may question any person who he or she believes to be entering or leaving Great Britain, to determine whether that person appears to be involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, and may stop and detain a person to exercise this power.

### **S33 TACT cordons**

An officer of at least the rank of Superintendent may make a designation that an area is a cordoned area for the purpose of the Terrorism Act 2000, as detailed in Section 33 of the Terrorism Act 2000. A designation may be made only if the person making it considers it expedient for the purpose of a terrorist investigation.

### **S43 TACT stops**

Allows a constable to stop and search a person who is reasonably suspected to be a terrorist to

discover if the person has anything in his or her possession that may constitute evidence of terrorism

#### **S44 TACT**

Allows constables to stop and search people or vehicles without reasonable grounds for suspicion in an authorised area for articles which could be used in connection with acts of terrorism

#### **Statutory Performance Indicator (SPI)**

APACS Statutory Performance Indicator

#### **Tension monitoring**

Community tension monitoring refers to the process of recording and analysing the state of community activity, and risk managing concerns or factors that may potentially lead to disorder or threaten the peace and stability of community relations in an area. The primary purpose of monitoring community tension is to provide local partners with intelligence in order to manage potential and emerging tensions in a systematic and effective way.

#### **TACT (Terrorism Act 2000)**

The definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 is included below. The act includes the extension of stop and search powers, proscription of terrorist organisations, and creates new offences relating to possession of terrorist material and property, terrorist instruction or training, and a duty to disclose information.

#### **Terrorism**

Terrorism Act 2000

1.—(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action Terrorism:

where— interpretation.

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),

(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—

(a) involves serious violence against a person,

(b) involves serious damage to property,

(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

#### **Violent extremism**

‘Violent extremism’ may be defined as the demonstration of unacceptable behaviour by using any means or medium to express views which:

- foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs;
- seek to provoke others to terrorist acts;
- foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or
- foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.

There are a number of offences that can be considered when dealing with violent extremism. They include offences arising through spoken words, creation of tapes and videos of speeches, internet entries, chanting, banners and written notes and publications. The main offences employed to date have been soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred.

# Appendix 5 References and further information

**Where links are not provided to documents they are available to police authorities from the APA.**

## HM Government

***The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, March 2009***

[http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO\\_Contest\\_strategy.pdf](http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf)

***Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery, June 2008***

<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy/>

***The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England, June 2008***

<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy/>

***Delivering the Prevent Strategy: Practical Steps for Local Partners, September 2008***

<http://prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/assets/pdf/Delivering%20the%20Prevent%20Strategy%2011092008.pdf>

***Delivering the Prevent Strategy: Updated Guide for Local Partners***

<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/updated-guide-for-local-partners?view=Binary>

***Delivering the Prevent Strategy – Guidance 1: Practical Steps for Local Partners, Updated June 2009***

***Delivering the Prevent Strategy – Guidance 2: Good Practice Examples, June 2009***

***Self-Assessing Local Performance Against***

***NI35: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism, Guidance for Local Partners, March 2009***

[http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/NI35\\_Guidance1.pdf?view=Binary](http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/NI35_Guidance1.pdf?view=Binary)

***National Guidance on Counter Terrorism Local Profiles for BCU Commanders and Local Authority Chief Executives, April 2009, RESTRICTED document***

## ACPO

***Prevent: Strategy and Delivery Plan. The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism, April 2008***

***Prevent: Implementation Plan Version 1.2, The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism, September 2008, RESTRICTED document***

***Prevent: Implementation Plan – A Summary for Partners Version 1.0, The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism, February 2009***

<http://prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/assets/pdf/Prevent%20PIP.pdf>

***Prevent Communications Strategy, April 2009***

***National Guidance on Prevent Case Management, August 2009, RESTRICTED document***

***Prevent, Police and Schools: Guidance for police officers and police staff to help schools contribute to the prevention of violent extremism, September 2009***

***Supporting Vulnerable Individuals: A Guide for Local Partnerships, to be published***

## **APA**

***Guidance for Police Authorities on the Performance Monitoring and Scrutiny of Protective Services, November 2008***

## **DCLG**

***Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Guidance Note, February 2007***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/publications/communities/preventingviolentpathfinderfundg>

***Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund 2007/08: Case Studies, April 2007***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/324967.pdf>

***Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds, April 2007***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/320752.pdf>

***Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund; Mapping of project activities 2007/2008***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/pathfinderfund200708>

***Empowering Muslim Women: Case Studies, January 2008***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/empoweringmuslimwomen>

***Preventing Violent Extremism, Next Steps for Communities, July 2008***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/preventingviolentextremismnext>

***Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities Reports, April 2009***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/racecohesionfaith/research/understandingmuslimcommunities/>

***Guidance on Evaluating Local Prevent Projects and Programmes, August 2009***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/localPREVENTprojectsprogrammes>

***National Indicator 35 – Building communities resilient to violent extremism assessment framework, 2008***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/preventingextremism/performanceindicator/>

***Delivering Prevent – Responding to Learning, December 2008***

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/deliveringprevent>

## **DCSF**

***Learning together to be safe: a toolkit to help schools contribute to the Prevention of violent extremism, October 2008***

[http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/violentextremism/downloads/DCSFLearning%20Together\\_bkml.pdf](http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/violentextremism/downloads/DCSFLearning%20Together_bkml.pdf)

## **DBIS**

***Learning together to be safe: a toolkit to help colleges contribute to the Prevention of violent extremism, February 2009***

<http://www.dius.gov.uk/~media/publications/L/learning-together-to-be-safe-online-version>

***Promoting good campus relations, fostering shared values and preventing violent extremism in Universities and Higher Education Colleges***

[http://www.dius.gov.uk/~media/ec\\_group/22-07-HE\\_on](http://www.dius.gov.uk/~media/ec_group/22-07-HE_on)

***The Role of FE Colleges in Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps, February 2009***

[http://www.dius.gov.uk/~media/publications/1/17193\\_DIUS\\_Next\\_Steps](http://www.dius.gov.uk/~media/publications/1/17193_DIUS_Next_Steps)

## HMIC

**HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Audit Commission, *Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and Development Exercise. Report to the Home Office and Communities and Local Government*, November 2008**

<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections/thematic/prevent-vio-ext-learning-dev/>

***Prevent – Progress and Prospects*, July 2009, RESTRICTED version available**

<http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections/thematic/prevent-report/prevent-report?view=Binary>

## LGA

***Leading the Preventing Violent Extremism Agenda: A Role Made for Councillors*, November 2008**

<http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/1181542>

***Leading the PVE Agenda – engaging, supporting and funding community groups*, November 2008**

<http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/publications/publication-display.do?id=1181541>

***Leading the Preventing Violent Extremism Agenda – one year on***

<http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/5556735>

## General

**DEMOS, *Bringing it Home: Community based approaches to counter terrorism*, 2006**

<http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Bringing%20it%20Home%20-20web.pdf?1240939425>

**New Local Government Network: *Stronger Together: A new approach to preventing violent extremism*, August 2009**

<http://www.nlgn.org.uk/public/wp-content/uploads/stronger-together.pdf>

***Preventing Extremism Together, Home Office Working Group Report*, October 2005**

<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/152164.pdf>

**Policy Exchange, *Choosing our friends wisely: Criteria for engagement with Muslim groups*, March 2009**

[http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Choosing\\_Our\\_Friends\\_Wisely.pdf](http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Choosing_Our_Friends_Wisely.pdf)

**The Taxpayers' Alliance, *Preventing Violent Extremism Grants*, September 2009**

<http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/prevent.pdf>

**Institute of Race Relations: *Spooked: How not to prevent violent extremism*, October 2009**

<http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf>

**Quilliam Foundation, *Pulling Together to Defeat Terror*, April 2008**

<http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/pulling-together-to-defeat-terror.pdf>

**University of Birmingham, *Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter Terrorism: An Examination*, January 2009**

<http://www.iass.bham.ac.uk/staff/basia-spalek/religiously-endorsed-violence-Full-Report.pdf>







**Association of Police Authorities  
15 Greycoat Place  
London SW1P 1BN**

**Tel 020 7664 3168  
Fax 020 7664 3191**

**[www.apa.police.uk](http://www.apa.police.uk)**